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ARTICLES
SCHOOL VIOLENCE: PROTECTING OUR
CHILDREN AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Donald L. Beci *
"Without saying a word, a 15-year-old boy bearing a grudge and
carrying a stolen .38-cal. Smith & Wesson revolver shot and killed
two fellow students . . .
"[P]olice discovered that a middle school student had kept a
sawed-off shotgun in his locker." 2
"[A] 13-year-old boy came to school with a loaded .22-caliber
rifle and took his teacher hostage.. . ."'
"[A]n angry 12-year-old boy tried to strangle one kid and took a
tire chain to two others at school."
4
"[In the] fatal stabbing of a 14-year-old girl [while in classroom,]
... . [h]er former boyfriend was charged with first-degree
murder."5
"A Grade 3 student in Chicago pulled a handgun out of his
bookbag and shot another student in the spine." 6
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Presently, school violence is reaching such extreme degrees that govern-
ment officials may feel compelled to sacrifice constitutional principles in or-
der to protect children. Although school boards and legislatures will
undoubtedly consider several methods of protection that are constitutionally
acceptable under the Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine,7 this
laudable effort to improve the safety of children while at school will include
other methods that are patently unconstitutional. Of greater significance is
the plethora of approaches which will fall within the questionable gray area
where their constitutional permissibility under Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence is uncertain. In society's zeal to protect school children, the methods
that are ultimately pursued, and which the Supreme Court Justices allow,
will have significant constitutional implications.
This Article will address the potential negative implications that efforts to
improve school safety may have on the evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Specifically, Part I of this Article identifies the escalating de-
gree of weapon-related violence' occurring within elementary and secondary
schools.9 Part I argues that although this school violence is an additional
7. While procedures used by public school officials to reduce school violence also raise
important Fifth Amendment issues, they will not be addressed in this Article. For a discussion
of pertinent Fifth Amendment issues, see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 930
(1987); Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978); Betts v. Board of Educ., 466
F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972); Pollnow v. Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 757
F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1985); Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995 (D. Me. 1982); Gonzales v.
McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp. 835 (N.D.
Tex. 1972); Adams v. City of Dothan Bd. of Educ., 485 So. 2d 757 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); In re
Drolshagen, 310 S.E.2d 927 (S.C. 1984); State v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984);
see also Larry Bartlett, Self-Incrimination and Public School Students, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 167
(1986); Robert J. Goodwin, The Fifth Amendment in Public Schools: A Rationale for its Appli-
cation in Investigations and Disciplinary Proceedings, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683 (1987).
8. The focus of this Article is on weapon-related violence. Neither drug searches, nor
procedures directed toward reducing physical violence perpetrated without weapons, will be
addressed. For a discussion of school drug searches, see Mary A. Shaughnessy, Sniff Searches
in Public Schools. Are They Allowed?, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 391 (1991) (discussing whether sniff
searches are unconstitutional); see also Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d
1309, 1318-22 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that random urinalysis program did not violate Fourth
Amendment); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983) (holding that canine inspection of student without individu-
alized suspicion is an unjustified intrusion); Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (rejecting the state's claim to a compelling inter-
est in conducting warrantless urine tests on students participating in extracurricular activities),
aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
(holding that canine search is constitutional), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982); Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Validity, Under
Federal Constitution, of Regulations, Rules, or Statutes Allowing Drug Testing of Students, 87
A.L.R. FED. 148 (1988).
9. While several interesting Fourth Amendment issues arise in the higher education set-
ting, this Article is limited to searches and seizures at the elementary and secondary school
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symptom of the deterioration of family and individual values, the commu-
nity nevertheless has an immediate ethical and legal duty to protect children,
particularly when it requires them to attend school. Part II reinforces the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to school situations, and addresses
the penalties which can be imposed upon a school official who conducts an
unconstitutional search. Part II also considers some of the methods em-
ployed by public" schools to enhance school safety, such as locker searches,
magnetometer searches, and strip searches, as well as the typical search of an
individual's possessions. This section then examines the compatibility of
various protective measures with evolving Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.
Part III addresses some of the specific repercussions that efforts to provide
safer schools may have on evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
These negative consequences arise out of the following queries. First, what
lessons are these actions to improve school safety teaching students about
the community's attitude toward personal liberty and privacy? Second, in
seeking to achieve the goal of protecting children, will society continue to
provide greater protection against arbitrary searches and seizures to adults
than it provides to children while in school? Third, if the Supreme Court
succumbs to the temptation to issue politically popular, result-oriented deci-
sions in a piecemeal fashion without regard to established Fourth Amend-
ment precedent, what will guide school boards and legislatures when called
upon to approve novel approaches for enhancing school safety? Finally, to
what degree will the Court permanently alter the balance of Fourth Amend-
ment interests by strengthening public safety while thwarting individual pri-
vacy and personal liberty?
Finally, Part IV suggests possible methods of reducing school violence,
which are conducive to instilling respect for individual privacy and liberty.
The community must not choose one goal to the exclusion of the other.
Rather, the community must achieve both goals by protecting children from
school violence while teaching and demonstrating respect for personal pri-
vacy and individual liberty. The approaches taken to protect children while
in school will challenge, stretch, and ultimately redefine the Fourth Amend-
ment as it is currently understood. The significance of such implications will
levels and does not address searches and seizures in dormitories and at universities in general.
See generally Michael L. Keller, Comment, Shall the Truce be Unbroken: New Jersey v.
T.L.O. and Higher Education, 12 J.C. & U.L. 415 (1985) (discussing searches and seizures at
the postsecondary education level).
10. The focus of this Article is limited to state-supported public schools, as the Fourth
Amendment does not regulate the conduct of purely private citizens who act without govern-
ment involvement. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
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go far beyond whether the assistant principal is successful in finding any-
thing when searching a student's bookbag.
I. PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM VIOLENCE WHILE IN SCHOOL
School children are inflicting violent harms upon each other at an alarm-
ing rate." A large portion of this violent behavior is weapon-related.1 2 The
community has an immediate responsibility to protect children from this
escalation of violence. Indeed, school officials have both a moral duty and a
legal duty to protect students from such violence.
In a recent national survey' 3 of school crime conducted over a six month
period, approximately one-half million American children reported exper-
iencing one or more violent crimes while at school.' 4 Students numbering
approximately three times that figure reported being the victims of property
crimes.' 5 When asked about their experiences with all crimes, not just those
that were violent or involved property, nearly two million children reported
being victimized at least once at school during the six-month period.' 6
Twenty-two percent of all children feared an attack at school, and almost
one-half million of them reported taking a weapon to school to protect
themselves. 7
Unfortunately, the school environment is simply a microcosm of larger
society; thus, the tremendous level of school violence is just one symptom
signaling the deterioration of family, community, and individual values in
our culture.' 8 A complete, long-term solution would therefore require heal-
11. LISA D. BASTIAN & BRUCE M. TAYLOR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SCHOOL CRIME: A
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT (NCJ-131645) (1991).
12. See Martin Halstuk, Increased Alarm Over Guns at School, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3,
1992, at A14 (reporting that San Francisco schools confiscated fifteen guns and 119 knives
from high school students, twenty guns and twenty-two knives from middle school students,
and three guns and ten knives from elementary school students); Carol Innerst, Pistol-Packing
Kids Put School on Alert, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1992, at Al (reporting that District of Co-
lumbia schools confiscated 242 weapons from students, a 91% increase over the previous
year); see also John H. Lee, Student, 13, is Arrested for Threats with Pistol, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 18,
1992, at B3; Andrew Martin, 8th-Grade Girl Stabs Classmate, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1992, at 6;
Steven R. Reed, 6 Wounded in School Shooting Spree, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 12, 1992, at Al;
Student Opens Fire in School, UPI, Sept. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File.
13. BASTIAN & TAYLOR, supra note 11.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 10-12.
18. For a contemporary discussion of family, community, and individual values, see How-
ard Fineman, Playing on the 'V Word,' NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1992, at 23; Joe Klein, Whose
Values?, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1992, at 19; Eloise Salholz et al., Values in the Classroom,
NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1992, at 26.
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ing the underlying ills responsible for deteriorating values. 9 Such a solu-
tion, which is also the solution to many other problems facing society, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article addresses the specific
steps being taken by schools to reduce violence and the effect these efforts
may have on the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. E°
A. An Ethical Obligation to Protect Children in the School Environment
The community has a moral responsibility to protect children while in
school, particularly since it mandates that the children attend school. All
states require compulsory school attendance either legislatively or through
constitutional provision.2 ' A state's authority to require compulsory school
attendance is justified under the common law doctrine of parens patriae.
22
In fact, a state's interest in providing for the well-being and education of
minors is so great that it normally has the power to require school attend-
ance over parental objection. 3 Indeed, a state's power may even extend to
requiring school attendance despite the child's or parent's religious beliefs
objecting to such education.24 Because a state requires such school attend-
ance, it has a moral duty to maintain student discipline 25 and to protect
children from violence that occurs while they are attending the very schools
to which the state has bound them to attend. This argument does not advo-
19. Such a comprehensive, long-term solution would also seek to alleviate the individual
isolation and "disempowerment" currently being endured by many members of our society.
20. The course of action pursued by school boards will affect a number of constituents.
These include students, administrators, parents, and teachers. The various constituents may
have competing demands and preferences. While school boards will undoubtedly be con-
cerned with the political implications of these demands and preferences, this Article does not
address such political considerations.
21. All fifty states have compulsory education laws. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26,
para. 26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1991) (requiring compulsory school attendance for children between
the ages of 7 and 16); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (requiring com-
pulsory school attendance for children between the ages of 5 and 16); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-
6-3001 (1992) (requiring compulsory school attendance for children between the ages of 6 and
17). The major differences among the statutes are the differences in minimum and maximum
age requirements. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-3-17 (Burns Supp. 1991) (requiring
children age 7 to 17 to attend school) with IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (Supp. 1992) (requiring
children age 7 to 16 to attend school).
22. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
23. Id. at 166.
24. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that parental interest in religious upbringing of children can outweigh
state interest in universal education).
25. Theories of discipline, and the legal requirements relating to student discipline, will
not be addressed in this Article. See generally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977)
(noting that while other legal remedies may be available to a student, the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit a school official from inflicting corporal punishment on a student); Fee v.
Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.) (discussing Ingraham and the constitutionality of corporal
punishment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 279 (1990).
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cate that in fulfilling the ethical obligation to protect students, a state should
repeal its compulsory school attendance laws. Nor does it advocate that a
state close its public schools26 in favor of increasingly popular, alternative
educational arrangements, such as private schools" and home schooling.2"
Historically, the American people have consistently placed great value on
public education,2 9 and claims have been made that children benefit from
being educated in a collective classroom environment rather than in individ-
ual seclusion at home.3 ° Although some argue, superficially, that the state
should not require children to attend schools if it cannot guarantee their
26. Students do not have a fundamental right to a public education under the federal
Constitution. Arguably, therefore, unless prohibited by its own law, a state could close all of
its public schools. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1983) (holding that public education
is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that education is neither explicitly nor implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution); cf Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (refusing
to allow county to close its public schools in order to avoid a desegregation mandate). For an
interesting discussion to the contrary, see Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a
Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Edu-
cation Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550 (1992) (arguing for a constitutional guarantee to public
education).
While students do not have a collective right to an education, once the state provides public
education, it must do so consistently, without discrimination. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231-32. In
addition, the state cannot deny an education to an individual student unless that student is
provided with due process of law. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
27. For a discussion comparing public and private education, see George W. Dent, Jr.,
Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 863 (1988).
28. For a discussion of home schooling, see Mark Murphy, Note, A Constitutional Analy-
sis of Compulsory School Attendance Laws in the Southeast: Do They Unlawfully Interfere with
Alternatives to Public Education?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 457 (1992); Edward K. Proctor, V,
Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1302 (1986).
29. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, Chief Justice
Warren noted:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493.
30. Several courts have held that it is permissible for a state to forbid home instruction as
a substitute to its compulsory school attendance requirement. See, e.g., Duro v. District At-
torney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding effective total ban on home schooling), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984). In so holding, many courts have reasoned that the state has a
legitimate interest in requiring children to be educated in a classroom since children can bene-
fit from social interaction with other children who have different attitudes and abilities. See




safety, this argument camouflages the real but more difficult need to make
public schools safer.3
B. A Legal Duty to Protect Children in the School Environment
Notwithstanding its moral responsibility, the state has a legal obligation to
protect students from violence and to remove weapons from their possession.
This duty springs from two separate sources.3 2 The first is the traditional in
loco parentis doctrine, which places a legal duty on school officials to act
pursuant to applicable tort law.33 The second imposes a legal duty on school
officials to comply with state statutes and school board regulations.3 4
Under the in loco parentis doctrine, teachers and school administrators are
liable for their omission or failure to act when a student is in danger within
the school setting. Underlying the doctrine is the theoretical supposition
that parents voluntarily delegate their authority to public school officials.3a
This principle supersedes the usual rule that members of the general public
3 6
do not have a general duty to come to the aid of a person in danger. Thus,
31. Private schools alone, even with additional public funding, cannot completely satisfy
the need to provide mass general education for all children. Even if private schools could
satisfy such a need, their lower levels of violence are arguably only the result of a selection
process that excludes disruptive children and allows school officials to treat such children in a
manner inconsistent with traditional Fourth Amendment liberty and privacy interests.
32. In addition to a legal duty arising out of these two sources, public school officials may
also have a duty to protect students from violent acts committed by other students, based on
the Fourteenth Amendment. This constitutional duty would arise only if a court accepted the
argument that compulsory school attendance laws restrain the personal liberty of students to
such an extent that the laws create a special custodial relationship between the student and
school. However, only two federal circuits have addressed this issue, and both have held that
there is no constitutional duty to protect school children from harm caused by their peers.
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc);
J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990).
33. See Hurlburt v. Noxon, 565 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that the
school district, acting in locoparentis, has a legal duty to protect students); see also Norman v.
Turkey Run Community Sch. Corp., 411 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 1980) (holding that teachers
have a special responsibility to supervise students); Eastman v. Williams, 207 A.2d 146, 148
(Vt. 1965) (recognizing that a teacher stands in the place of the parent); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 320 cmts. a, b, d (1986).
34. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (ad-
dressing a school board's power to promulgate rules and regulations).
35. However, it should be noted that the supposition that parents voluntarily delegate
their authority to school officials does not exempt public school officials from complying with
Fourth Amendment requirements. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) ("In
carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions ... school officials act as representatives
of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents'
immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment."); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (noting that the concept of a voluntary delegation of authority may be
inconsistent with compulsory education laws).
36. Of course, in the same capacity as members of the general public, teachers and school
administrators are also liable for any of their negligent acts which cause injury to a student.
1992]
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teachers and school administrators have an affirmative duty to protect stu-
dents in danger who are subject to a foreseeable risk of harm. The scope of a
teacher's duty under the doctrine is determined by measuring the teacher's
actual conduct against the actions that a reasonable teacher would take,
under similar circumstances, to protect a student from injury.37
In addition to the legal duties arising out of the in loco parentis doctrine,
school officials must also protect students by enforcing state statutes and
school board regulations. Indeed, state legislatures and school boards have
imposed a myriad of requirements upon teachers and administrators to en-
sure school safety. 38 Significantly, many of these statutes39 and regulations'
prohibit the possession of weapons on school grounds.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
EDS., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (5th ed. 1984).
37. For example, it is understood that students should not possess fireworks while at
school, because other students would be at risk of injury. A teacher, therefore, would have an
affirmative duty to remove such fireworks from a student's possession. The teacher would
have such a duty even if there were no law prohibiting the possession of fireworks in schools.
The teacher's conduct would be measured against that of a reasonably prudent teacher under
similar circumstances. For a discussion of the scope of a teacher's duty, see Ferraro v. Board
of Educ., 212 N.Y.S.2d 615, 626 (App. Term.), aff'd, 221 N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1961);
Quigley v. School Dist., 446 P.2d 177, 177 (Or. 1968); Cherney v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 289 N.W.2d 372, 372 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (unpublished limited precedent opinion); John
Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless
Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1978); Christopher Bello, Annotation, Personal Liability of
Public School Teacher in Negligence Action for Personal Injury or Death of Student, 34
A.L.R.4TH 228 (1984).
For a general discussion of teacher tort liability, see Thompson v. Ange, 443 N.Y.S.2d 918
(App. Div. 1981); Fuzie v. South Haven Sch. Dist., 553 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sup. Ct. 1990), aff'd
575 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 1991); cf. Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 242
Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1987), transferred, 261 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal.), and vacated, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 303 (Ct. App.), and supp. op., 263 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1989); Rodriguez v. In-
glewood Unified Sch. Dist., 230 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1987).
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-307(a), 308, 309(a)-(c) (1990) (requiring school
officials to immediately excuse from school and report to the local health authority any person
who shows symptoms of sickness or disease); 28 PA. CODE § 27.72 (1979) (requiring all teach-
ers to maintain order and discipline in the areas of school over which they have authority and
provide students with various services, such as administering drugs or emergency health care,
in order to ensure students' health and well-being); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 177.1 (1988)
(requiring educators to maintain standards of professional responsibility and ethical conduct
when interacting with students, faculty, parents, administrators, and the community, in order
to ensure a productive school environment).
39. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A,
§ 6552 (West 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (Consol. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2
(1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04 (West 1992).
40. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (1991);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-502(a)-(b)(Michie 1991); 1992 LA. ACTS 198.
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II. METHODS TO ENHANCE SCHOOL SAFETY MUST COMPLY WITH
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE REQUIREMENTS
It is clear that the Fourth Amendment does not apply unless one has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in what is being searched.4' The current
"expectation of privacy" reasoning was first articulated by Justice Harlan in
Katz v. United States. 42 When this standard is applied to the school setting,
the constitutionality of many searches will turn on whether a student has a
legitimate expectation of privacy.43 Accordingly, methods used to enhance
school safety must comply with the Fourth Amendment where they invade
areas in which the student has such an expectation of privacy. 44 Many
courts have held that if a search in a public school violates Fourth Amend-
ment requirements, the contraband discovered is subject to the exclusionary
rule45 and thus will not be admissible in a criminal prosecution against the
student.46 However, the Fourth Amendment is not limited to criminal in-
vestigations; it applies to all searches and seizures by state47 agents, regard-
41. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see,
e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211
(1986) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy against aerial surveillance
under the Fourth Amendment); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to "shakedown" searches of prison cells as prisoners have
no legitimate expectation of privacy in cell or property therein); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (finding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit chemical field-
testing of powdered drugs because a person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
whether a substance is illicit).
42. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
43. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
44. Id. at 333.
45. This assumes that the contraband is "fruit of the poisonous tree," Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), that there is no attenuation, that no exception is applicable,
and that the student has standing to challenge the Fourth Amendment violation.
46. In TL.O., the Court refrained from resolving whether the exclusionary rule is an
appropriate remedy for school searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
For cases holding that the exclusionary rule prevents government use of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence in subsequent proceedings, see Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F.
Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975);
People v. D., 315 N.E.2d 466 (N.Y. 1974). See generally Charles W. Hardin, Jr., Comment,
Searching Public Schools: T.L.O. and the Exclusionary Rule, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 1099 (1986)
(discussing whether evidence obtained through student searches by school officials is subject to
the exclusionary rule); Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Case, of Evi-
dence Obtained by Search Conducted by School Official or Teacher, 49 A.L.R.3D 978 (1973)
(tracing the weaknesses of the Supreme Court's articulation of Fourth Amendment guidelines
and protections and stressing the importance of extending exclusionary rule protection to stu-
dents). But see State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975).
47. Because the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted as incorporating the Fourth
Amendment, states and their subdivisions must comply with Fourth Amendment require-
ments. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
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less of whether the search results in a criminal prosecution.48 Neither the
amendment's express wording,4 9 nor its subsequent interpretation by the
Supreme Court,50 restricts its application to criminal prosecutions. There-
fore, school officials must comply with the Fourth Amendment even if no
criminal prosecution results from a search of a student conducted on school
grounds by those officials.5 '
A. Penalties Against School Officials who Violate the Fourth Amendment
As is customary under the law, however, it is left to individual plaintiffs
(i.e., students and/or their parents) or conscientious school board attorneys
to ensure that Fourth Amendment rights are protected. There are various
legal remedies which a student can pursue against a school board and its
agents for violating his or her Fourth Amendment rights. Chief among
these remedies are those available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.52 A § 1983 ac-
tion may provide both injunctive relief and compensatory damages to a stu-
dent who is subjected to an unlawful search conducted by school officials. 53
While injunctive relief is only appropriate when there is a clear pattern of
48. While the Fourth Amendment is applicable to seized evidence that will not be used in
a criminal prosecution, the absence of prosecution is one of the factors considered in assessing
the reasonableness of the search. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)
(reasoning that one of the factors contributing to the determination of reasonableness was that
the inspection of an apartment was not aimed at discovering evidence of a crime).
49. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-15 (1987) (applying the Fourth
Amendment to non-criminal search of employee's office by hospital administrators); Camara,
387 U.S. at 530 (applying the Fourth Amendment to non-criminal warrantless search of apart-
ment by city housing inspectors).
51. See Ortega, 480 U.S. at 714 ("The strictures of the Fourth Amendment... have been
applied to the conduct of governmental officials in various civil activities."); One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (applying the Fourth Amendment to
forfeiture proceedings, although they were not criminal proceedings).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute, which creates a Fourteenth Amendment dam-
ages action, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
53. This Article will not address broader issues of immunity or intricate aspects of § 1983
actions. For thorough attention to such matters, see 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (3d ed. 1991).
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conduct by school officials which violates Fourth Amendment rights on an
ongoing or repeated basis,54 an action for money damages is an appropriate
remedy for isolated violations. 55 An individual or school official who vio-
lates a student's Fourth Amendment rights with deliberate indifference or
reckless disregard can also be ordered to pay punitive damages.56 Further-
more, under 18 U.S.C. § 242," 7 the criminal counterpart to § 1983, a school
official who willfully violates a student's Fourth Amendment rights can be
criminally prosecuted.58 While a § 1983 action may not be brought against
a state or a state agency (i.e., the state department of education),59 an official
from the state or state agency can be sued in his or her individual capacity.6°
In addition, suit may be brought against municipalities, counties, school dis-
tricts, and individuals.6 ' Finally, a § 1983 suit is actionable even in states
that have not abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
6 2
B. The Compatibility of Specific Protective Measures
with the Fourth Amendment
While current Fourth Amendment guidelines governing school searches
are derived from a number of Supreme Court opinions,63 the Court has ex-
54. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (deeming injunctive relief appropriate when
there is persistent pattern of police misconduct); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974)
(same).
55. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (approving recovery of money damages from federal agents who violated
plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights).
56. While only compensatory damages are available in an action against a local govern-
ment, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), both punitive and
compensatory damages can be awarded in a § 1983 action against an individual defendant, see
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 242 provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988).
58. Id.
59. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
60. See also id. at 61.
61. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
62. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
63. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984) (holding that the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment turns on whether the person invoking its protection has a legitimate
expectation of privacy); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978) (noting that
individual privacy interests can be jeopardized by government investigations which are under-
taken to enforce civil statutes and regulatory standards, as well as by government investiga-
tions seeking to enforce the criminal law); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968) (reasoning
that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy); Camara v. Munic-
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plicitly confronted school searches on only one occasion.64 In New Jersey v.
TL.. , 65 the Court expressly articulated what is required of school officials
before they may conduct a search of either a student's person or a closed
purse or bag carried by that person.66 In T.L.O., the Court reduced one,
and eliminated a second, of the traditional Fourth Amendment safeguards
applicable to searches. First, while school officials cannot conduct a search
based on a mere "hunch," the basis for that search does not have to satisfy
the higher threshold requirement of probable cause, which ordinarily applies
to Fourth Amendment searches. Instead, a school official need only have a
reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence of a legal viola-
tion or an infraction of school disciplinary rules.67 Second, contrary to the
traditional requirement, public school officials do not have to obtain a war-
rant before searching school children.68
However, in TL.O., the Court did maintain the requirement that the
search must be reasonable. 69 Reasonableness is determined by a two-step
analysis: first, the search must not be "excessively intrusive in light of the
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,"7 and second,
the measures adopted must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the
search."71 In analyzing this methodology, it may be inferred that the
Court's present interpretation of the Fourth Amendment appears to permit
various methods of excluding weapons from public schools through student
searches. Unfortunately, since the Court has not yet expressly addressed the
constitutionality of most of these methods, their legitimacy is uncertain,
leaving school officials to independently decide what is permissible. The fol-
lowing three search procedures used in schools will be briefly addressed:
locker searches, magnetometer searches, and strip searches.
1. Searches of Lockers, Desks, and Other School Property
In T.L.O., the Court explicitly refrained from deciding whether a student
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a locker, desk, or other school
ipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (noting that the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect individual privacy from arbitrary invasions by government officials); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967) (holding that there be a reasonable relationship between
the item for which officials are searching and the infraction under investigation).
64. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 231-32 (2d
ed. 1992).
65. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
66. Id. at 338.
67. Id. at 341.
68. Id. at 340.
69. Id. at 341.




property.7 2 Consequently, the Court did not resolve what, if any, standard
governs searches of such areas.7 3 Nevertheless, the expectation of privacy
analysis can logically apply to the school setting. In situations where the
school administration and students share joint control of lockers, desks, or
other school property, the students would not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in such property;74 thus, in the absence of a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy, Fourth Amendment requirements would be inapplicable.
Indeed, the majority of cases which have addressed locker searches concur
in this analysis.75
In contrast, it is unknown what Fourth Amendment requirements must
be satisfied by school officials when courts find that a student does have a
legitimate expectation of privacy.7 6 Rather than apply the TL.O. reason-
able suspicion standard, the Court could condition such searches on a war-
rant supported by probable cause. While this outcome is conceivable, it is
unlikely, given the Court's current pattern of reducing threshold search re-
quirements.7 7 In fact, those courts which have concluded that students have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school prop-
erty,7 8 generally allow school officials to search such areas without a war-
rant, if they have satisfied the lower reasonable suspicion standard of
TL. 0.
9
72. Id. at 337 n.5.
73. Id. at 337.
74. The school administration can minimize the possibility that students will be deemed
to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers. At the beginning of each academic year,
school officials can announce a policy of searching lockers and can give notice that the admin-
istration has key or combination access to all lockers. Such efforts would be more prudent in
jurisdictions that are inclined to find that students have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
75. See, e.g., Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that be-
cause both the school and the student exercise joint control over a school locker, the school has
a right to inspect it); People v. Overton, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598 (N.Y. 1967) (arguing that nonex-
clusive nature of student locker empowers school to consent to search), remittitur amended,
245 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y.), and adhered to, 249 N.E.2d 366 (N.Y. 1969).
76. As noted, the constitutionality of such searches has not yet been addressed by the
Court. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1983) (recognizing that impor-
tant law enforcement interests may support a minimally intrusive search and seizure based on
less than probable cause); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (ruling
that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a limited search and seizure
on facts not constituting probable cause); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972)
(holding that an individual may be briefly detained with less than probable cause).
78. See, e.g., In re T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 943 (N.J. 1983) (stating that student has expec-
tation of privacy in school locker), rev'd on other grounds, 469 U.S. 325 (1985); State v. Joseph
T., 336 S.E.2d 728, 737-38 (W. Va. 1985).
79. See Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d at 737-38 (upholding students' reasonable expectation of
privacy in lockers but permitting searches under the reasonable suspicion standard); State v.
Slattery, 787 P.2d 932, 935 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding search of student's locker, auto-
mobile, and locked briefcase therein, by applying reduced threshold requirements of T.L.O.).
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2. Magnetometer Searches
Schools are increasingly using metal detectors to keep guns, knives, and
other weapons out of school buildings.8" However, the proper application of
the Fourth Amendment to such searches is slightly more complicated than is
readily apparent. Indeed, and perhaps because, members of the public sub-
mit to magnetometer searches on numerous occasions, it is commonly as-
sumed that the widespread use of such detectors is constitutionally
permissible. However, the Court has not yet directly addressed the Fourth
Amendment validity of suspicionless magnetometer searches.8' Generally,
lower courts evaluate magnetometer searches as an administrative search,82
and many courts have held magnetometer searches constitutional in specific
situations.83 Typically, after balancing the invasiveness of the search against
the need for the search, courts conclude that the search is reasonable.8 4
Today, magnetometers are commonly used at airports, performing arts cen-
ters, public buildings, and courthouses.8 ' However, the justification for this
type of search-to prevent members of the public from being exposed to
80. John Kass, Daley Offers Metal Detectors to Schools, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 5, 1992, at
Cl (reporting that Chicago Mayor Richard Daley offered to provide two metal detectors to
each of Chicago's 74 high schools in an effort to combat rising crime statistics, which indicate
that one serious crime arrest is made for every two high school classrooms).
81. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.15 (1989).
82. For a discussion of administrative searches, see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 10.1-.11 (2d ed. 1987).
83. For cases concluding that airport magnetometer searches are constitutional, see
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d
1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also, Myrna G. Baskin & Laura M. Thomas,
Note, School Metal Detector Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Empirical Study, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 1037 (1986) (suggesting that the development of alternative methods to de-
crease school violence would better protect students' Fourth Amendment rights than the use
of magnetometer searches).
84. While the searches are undertaken without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, courts are generally more willing to find them reasonable since the potential for
arbitrariness is eliminated. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 64, at 227-28 (outlin-
ing the development of airport magnetometer searches and the application of both the reason-
able suspicion test and the Fourth Amendment balancing test to determine if such searches are
constitutional).
85. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (commenting on the common use of magnetome-
ters at airports); Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Validity, Under Federal Constitution, of Search
Conducted as Condition of Entering Public Building, 53 A.L.R. FED. 888 (1991) (analyzing the
use of magnetometers in public buildings); Baskin & Thomas, supra note 83, at 1058; see, e.g.,
Philip Hager, Security Measures at Courts are Changed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1992, at B3
(discussing the use of magnetometers at specific state and federal courthouses); William C.
Lhotka, St. Louis Shootout, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1992, at 6 (reporting the installation of mag-
netometers at a state courthouse); Daniel Wise, Courthouse Search Permitted, N.Y.L.J., Mar.




significant risks of harm when they voluntarily convene in public areas-
breaks down when submission to a magnetometer is a compulsory, rather
than a voluntary, act by an individual. Accordingly, a distinction should be
made between the use of such detectors at locations where members of the
public can prevent the search by choosing not to enter, and those locations
where persons must enter. For example, an individual can choose not to
enter a performing arts center, or even an airport, where a magnetometer
search will be performed. However, compulsory education laws require stu-
dents to enter a school building, even when a magnetometer search is being
conducted at its doorway.8 6 Unlike the passenger at an airport, the student
is not free to terminate the search. Indeed, in a footnote to National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 7 quoting from United States v. Ed-
wards,"8 Justice Kennedy seemed to indicate that one of the reasons why a
suspicionless airport magnetometer search was reasonable was that any per-
son could avoid the search by electing not to board the aircraft. 9 Arguably,
then, it is constitutionally impermissible to conduct a suspicionless magne-
tometer search upon a person who cannot terminate the search. A student
entering the schoolhouse is such a person.
Alternatively, the Court could decide that when students receive advance
notice that suspicionless magnetometer searches will be conducted, their use
in schools is constitutionally valid. This would place the burden on students
to minimize the intrusiveness of such searches by choosing not to carry
weapons into school; thus, while the student would still be required to sub-
mit to the magnetometer search, the student would avoid the greater intru-
siveness of the additional personal search triggered by a magnetometer alert.
The Court could use a balancing approach and conclude that the need for
school safety outweighs this minimal level of intrusiveness. However, as Jus-
tice Kennedy implicitly acknowledged, the initial walk through a magne-
tometer constitutes a search regardless of its degree of intrusiveness.
Although students cannot choose to avoid these searches, school officials are
86. For a discussion of compulsory education laws, see supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
87. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (1989) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d
496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original)).
88. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500.
89. As Justice Kennedy noted:
"When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of
property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that danger alone
meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the . . . passenger has been given advance
notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel
by air."
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (1989) (quoting Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500 (emphasis in
original)).
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increasingly subjecting school children to such searches despite the Court's
failure to rule on their constitutionality.
3. Strip Searches
One of the more profound Fourth Amendment issues arising in the school
context involves the strip search of students.9" Although the TL.O. 91 deci-
sion did not directly address student strip searches, it did deal with the
search of a student's person. Since a strip search is essentially just a more
extreme form of such a search, it logically follows that the TL.O. reasona-
bleness requirement 92 would be one of the tests applied to measure the con-
stitutionality of a strip search. If the Court were to adopt this approach, a
strip search would be unconstitutional unless it were reasonable in light of its
particular facts. Specifically, to determine whether a strip search is reason-
able in scope, a reviewing court would consider the nature of the infraction,
the intrusiveness of the strip search, the gender of the student, and the age of
the student.93 Lacking direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts
94
generally adopt this analysis to determine the constitutionality of school
strip searches.
Aside from the reasonableness requirement, it is unclear whether the
Court would require that other traditional Fourth Amendment safeguards
be met before school officials are permitted to strip search school children.
Given the invasiveness of such searches, and the fact that children are in-
90. Even more vital may be the applicability of Fourth Amendment principles to body
cavity searches. Supreme Court caselaw involving intrusive searches outside of the school
setting indicates that the ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements pertaining to a given situ-
ation will apply to a cavity search, but that the key to determining the constitutionality of a
particular body cavity search will be an evaluation of its reasonableness. Compare United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536-44 (1985) (approving administration by
customs agents of a pregnancy test, x-ray and rectal examination of an international airplane
passenger) with Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758-67 (1985) (disapproving surgery to obtain
evidence of a crime).
Because body cavity searches are conducted for the purpose of detecting drugs rather than
weapons, they will not be addressed further in this Article. For an example of lower court
reasoning regarding body cavity searches in schools, see Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982-
83 (6th Cir. 1984) (dictum) (concluding that body cavity searches of students to detect illegal
drugs are per se unreasonable), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
91. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-43 (1985) (discussing reasonableness).
92. Id. at 343-48.
93. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Strip searches would appear to be
rarely necessary if the goal of the search is to detect weapons. Because they are extremely
intrusive, as well as of little value, it is the author's opinion that strip searches of students by
school officials should almost always be considered unreasonable.
94. For a discussion of strip searches in Pennsylvania schools, see Donald B. Kaufman,
Comment, Strip Search in Pennsylvania Public Schools, 90 DICK. L. REV. 803 (1986).
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volved, 95 the Court has the opportunity to require that school officials ensure
that the threshold requirements, i.e., a warrant and/or probable cause, are
satisfied before conducting such searches. However, since the Court has yet
to specifically address the constitutionality of strip searches, and given the
Court's concern over school violence,9 6 it is more probable that strip
searches will be permitted without a warrant and only upon a showing of
reasonable suspicion.9 7 As in T.L.O., constitutionality will then turn on the
reasonableness of the searches.
III. THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SAFER
SCHOOLS ON FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Student Respect for Liberty and Privacy is Corrupted by the
Enforcement Measures Schools Adopt to Stop Violence
Actions to improve school safety strive to achieve a necessary and com-
mendable goal. However, some of these actions may risk significant damage
to evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence if undertaken hastily and
without careful and thorough consideration.
Current methods used to improve school safety play a dual role: they
provide a means to protect today's students while influencing how future
generations interpret and modify the Fourth Amendment. Undoubtedly, the
approaches tomorrow's leaders will take toward the amendment will be
shaped by the lessons they learn as today's school children. 98 Students learn
about the liberty, privacy, and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment more through actions than words. Consequently, students are more
likely to learn how to resolve conflicts between personal liberty and public
safety from witnessing bookbag searches than from passively completing
their reading assignments. Thus, the pedagogical implications of overly in-
trusive policing methods must be considered in the attempt to maintain a
degree of order in an environment that is conducive to learning. Although
95. See Tartar v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1984) (" 'It does not require a
constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion
of constitional rights of some magnitude.' ") (quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
96. Writing for the majority in T.L. ., Justice White noted that "in recent years, school
disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools
have become major social problems." 469 U.S. at 339.
97. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d
881, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that reasonable suspicion is proper standard for strip
search).
98. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("That they
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.").
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students will not be able to learn if they are sent into a war zone where their
personal safety is threatened on a daily basis by weapon-wielding "class-
mates," they should not learn that a safe, orderly learning environment re-
quires authoritarian and repressive tactics. To achieve this balance, the goal
of maintaining a safe and orderly environment conducive to student health
and education must be weighed against that of preserving traditional respect
for individual liberty and privacy. Both goals must be accomplished, be-
cause they both affect what today's children are being taught as they grow
into tomorrow's leaders.
B. Even Greater Protection Against Arbitrary Searches and Seizures Will
Be Given to Adults Than to Children While in School
Many uphold the belief that children hold a special place in society and
that they are in need of extra care and guidance; indeed, numerous precepts
and doctrines in American law incorporate this assumption.9 9 Ironically, in
an apparent attempt to protect children, the Supreme Court has, within the
context of the school environment, reduced the threshold requirements nec-
essary to justify a Fourth Amendment search."° As previously noted, the
Court interprets the Fourth Amendment to permit some student searches to
be justified by the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, but generally re-
quires adult searches to be justified by probable cause. "' This suggests that
the need for a student search outweighs the student's Fourth Amendment
rights to a greater degree than the need for an adult search outweighs the
rights of the general citizen. However, adult searches usually arise in the
criminal context, while school searches generally do not. Thus, it is reason-
99. Areas of law specifically addressing child-related issues include criminal law, labor
law, and family law. See, e.g., Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 (1988)
(governing juvenile delinquency proceedings); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308 (1981) (pro-
viding for protection of child's records and files from arbitrary disclosure); United States v.
Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir.) (holding defendant incapable of being held criminally liable
as adult in federal court for conduct engaged in under the age of eighteen), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 610 (1991); Coleman v. Alabama, 827 F.2d 1469 (11 th Cir. 1987) (interpreting state youth-
ful offender statute as creating a new method of adjudication of juveniles); United States v.
Frasquillo-zomosa, 626 F.2d 99 (9th Cir.) (discussing the purpose of the juvenile system), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212(c) (1975)
(prohibiting employers from employing "oppressive child labor"); Hodgson v. Cactus Craft,
481 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1973) (interpreting child labor task restrictions implemented by Depart-
ment of Labor regulations); Oppressive Child Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 570.117-.120 (1991); GA.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-3(12) (1990) (defining "legal custody" for purposes of child custody laws);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(C) (Anderson 1990) (defining "dependent child" for pur-
poses of child abuse and neglect laws); Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973)
(interpreting state statute governing removal of child from parental custody), aff'd, 414 U.S.
1139 (1974).
100. See TL.O, 469 U.S. at 325.
101. See supra part 1I.13.
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able to infer that the Court interprets the Constitution as giving greater pre-
search protection to adult criminal suspects than to students searched within
schools.
Moreover, although students in the school environment are given less pro-
tection against arbitrary searches and seizures than adults, they are given the
same protection as adults outside the school environment. 102 Yet the Court
has never indicated that Fourth Amendment rights depend on a person's
age, nor has it held that such rights turn exclusively on where a person is
located when being searched.10 3 As the Court expressly stated in Katz, "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."''" Apparently, then, the
Court's primary justification for reducing the level of protection provided by
the Fourth Amendment is its conviction that the safety of children while in
school warrants such action.
Assuming the Court's justification for this reduced level of protection is
valid, such justification prompts additional inquiry into what standard
should regulate searches by school officials of parents who have occasion to
be in their child's school. Because adults have a number of legitimate rea-
sons to be on school premises-ranging from participating in parent-teacher
conferences, to attending sporting events and theatrical productions-the
question arises whether the rights of adults should be given the greater pro-
tection ordinarily afforded to adults and children outside the school environ-
ment, or whether adults should be subjected to the reduced standard which
pertains to children while in the school.'0 5 If the need to protect students
justifies reduced Fourth Amendment protection, then a school coach or
drama teacher should circumscribe conceivable danger and conduct a search
regardless of whether the danger is posed by another student or a visiting
parent. What justification, other than age, is there for not requiring an adult
102. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (holding that "the Fourth Amendment
applies to minors in the same manner as adults"); In Re S.J.F., 736 P.2d 29, 30 (Colo. 1987)
("The general rule, which applies to both minors and adults, is that a search must be con-
ducted in accordance with fourth amendment rights."); In Re Marsh, 237 N.E.2d 529, 530
(Il1. 1968) (holding the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to proceedings under
the Juvenile Court Act); Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Ap-
peal for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the
Schools, 22 GA. L. REv. 897, 907 (1988) ("Outside the context of school searches, the courts
grant full fourth amendment protection to young people subjected to searches and seizures by
the police."). But cf. W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043, 1046 (1980) (Marshall, J. dissenting)
("The Court has never previously considered the scope of Fourth Amendment protections
when asserted by a minor ... [nor] attempted to define the 'totality of the relationship of the
juvenile and the state.' ") (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)) (footnote omitted).
103. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("Wherever a man may be, he is
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.").
104. Id. at 351.
105. The author has been unable to locate any appellate authority addressing this question.
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to submit to a search by the school coach or drama teacher who has met the
reduced showing necessary to justify the search of a school child? Such an
inquiry may assist the Court in determining whether it will continue to inter-
pret the amendment as providing a reduced level of protection to searches of
children in school.
Historically, society has not always believed that children hold a special
place and deserve distinctive treatment. Since the late 1800s, society's col-
lective perception of how children should be treated in American culture has
vacillated.'1 6 The public outlook periodically moves across a spectrum. At
one end of the spectrum, children are viewed as nothing more than "little
adults," and their conduct and responsibilities are held to standards similar
to those applied to adults. When this perception prevails, children are not
viewed as being innocent or in need of extra care. At the other end of the
spectrum, children are viewed as being pure and faultless. When this out-
look prevails, children are more deserving of special treatment."0 7 Conse-
quently, the Court should be particularly sensitive to the need to protect
both the liberty and safety interests of students during periodic fluctuations
in the public's attitude toward the proper role of children in society.
C. The Court Fails to Guide School Boards and Legislatures
The Court has a duty under the doctrine of stare decisis to interpret the
Fourth Amendment consistently and to apply precedent.' 0 8 Yet there ap-
pears to be a growing public sentiment favoring the use of increasingly ad-
versarial law enforcement methods in schools.10 9 In an effort to protect
children, the Court may acquiesce to public demands and render result-ori-
106. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DE-
LINQUENCY (2d. ed., 1977); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985).
107. According to one sociological theory, society's shifting attitude toward children is
most apparent when considering periodic differences in styles of children's clothing. During
the times when fashion dictates that children be dressed as "miniature adults," society treates
them less as children and more as adults. In contrast, when children are dressed in unique,
cuddly, childish attire, society views them more warmly than it does adults. See generally
PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (Robert Baldick trans., 1962).
108. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307 (1962) (noting that the Supreme
Court should not disregard implications of exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper
for many years); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958) (recognizing that a long
course of adjudication in the Supreme Court carries impressive authority); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (noting that continuity of decisions on constitutional questions is
desirable); Wright v. Sill, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 544, 544 (1863) ("A question repeatedly argued
and decided must be considered as no longer open for discussion, whatever differences of opin-
ion may once have existed on the subject in this Court.").
109. See, e.g., Stefanie Asin, School Needs More Security, Parents Say, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 23, 1992, at A13; Halstuk, supra note 12; Laura M. Litvan, Gun Hunt in PG.- School
Locker Searches Approved, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 1992, at AI; Patti Muck, Teen Shooting
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ented holdings that are inconsistent with current Fourth Amendment doc-
trine." ° In a result-oriented opinion, the Court would uphold a school
official's specific acts on the ground that such acts achieved an outcome that
the Court construes as desirable. Thus, the Court would not necessarily
reach its decision by conforming to accepted doctrine. In more precarious
result-oriented opinions, the Court's articulated reasoning would be incon-
sistent with that of settled precedent and even with the reasoning set forth in
other result-oriented opinions.
While the thought of result-oriented decisionmaking may not offend those
who are comfortable with a pragmatic approach, a careful examination
reveals that such an approach has serious negative results even for the prag-
matist. Thoughtfully developed precedent articulates reasoning that can be
applied to novel fact situations, and thus creates stability and predictability
within that area of law. Consequently, when new situations arise-the vast
majority of which will never reach the Supreme Court-they can be resolved
through adherence to the reasoning and methodology of such established
precedent. Thus, when the Court renders opinions consistent with settled
Fourth Amendment doctrine, it provides essential guidance to teachers, ad-
ministrators, school boards, and legislatures.
In contrast, result-oriented opinions give no guidance to those who must
resolve situations which have not yet been addressed by the Court. Because
the Court elects to hear only a small percentage of cases,"' lower courts
must rule on the constitutional validity of new approaches to reduce
weapon-related school violence. Unfortunately, these courts may be re-
quired to struggle with, and apply, the conflicting reasoning articulated in
result-oriented opinions.
Spurs Security Talks, Hous. CHRON., June 12, 1992, at A22; Liz Wallen, More Sought for Safe
Schools, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1992, at 63.
110. Recently, the Court has revealed its awareness of, and susceptibility to, the type of
political pressures that could lead to result-oriented holdings. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992), the Court openly noted the ardent and antagonistic public
opinion regarding the legal right to an abortion. See id. Acknowledging both public opinion
and the appearance that the Court was responding to such opinion, Justice Souter indicated
that the loss of public confidence in the judiciary would seriously weaken the Court's capacity
to exercise judicial power. Id. at 2815-16. While the majority's reasoning opposed overruling
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it suggested that the Court considers public opinion when
reevaluating established doctrine. The majority also suggested that considerations of public
opinion, and the immediate practical consequences of a holding, may be more readily taken
into account when the established doctrine to be overruled is less controversial than in the
abortion controversy. Thus, in less controversial cases, succumbing to public opinion would
be less likely to weaken the Court's capacity to exercise judicial power.
11. The Supreme Court heard a total of only 127 cases during the 1991-92 term. Further-
more, only once in the past several years, has the Court addressed student searches. New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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D. The Court May Permanently Rebalance Traditional Fourth
Amendment Interests and Disregard Liberty, Privacy, and
Individual Security
There is another manner in which the Court could acquiesce to growing
political demands that schools employ increasingly adversarial law enforce-
ment methods. Rather than issue piecemeal result-oriented opinions, which
ignore past decisions and traditions, the Court could opt to squarely overrule
established precedent, thereby altering the necessary balance between con-
tending Fourth Amendment interests. This course of action would have
more far-reaching consequences. Before the Court discards precedent, it
should carefully consider the potential negative repercussions which new
rulings may have on evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
At the core of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are two vital but com-
peting objectives: enforcement of public safety and protection of individual
liberty. However, actions which further one goal often frustrate the other.
To protect public safety, government officials seek to enforce rules through
various policing methods; yet, to protect personal liberty, the Court limits
intrusions into areas of individual privacy. In the criminal context, individ-
ual liberty and public safety are balanced against each other. Recently, how-
ever, the Court has hinted that it will tilt the balance in favor of law
enforcement, precedent notwithstanding.
In California v. Acevedo," 2 Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, urged
the Court to deviate from traditional Fourth Amendment interpretation.
Justice Scalia advocated elimination of the general rule that a search by law
enforcement officials requires a warrant." 13 Instead of a general warrant re-
quirement with specific exceptions, Justice Scalia submitted that a warrant
should be required only when a case-by-case analysis indicates that it is nec-
essary under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.'
Moreover, the Court increasingly recognizes situations in which it is willing
to depart from the usual Fourth Amendment threshold requirements of a
warrant and probable cause." 5 In particular, when the Court perceives gov-
ernment officials as having "special needs" beyond criminal law enforce-
ment, it is additionally inclined to allow searches without warrants, probable
cause, or even individualized suspicion." 6 Writing for the majority in Skin-
112. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
113. Id. at 1992-04 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. Id.
115. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (permitting officers to make warrantless, lim-
ited search, of areas in an arrestee's home where persons may be hidden, with only a reason-
able suspicion of bodily harm).
116. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (allowing
employer to conduct urine testing without a warrant or a showing of individualized suspicion);
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ner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, " Justice Kennedy noted that
"[w]hen faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the
governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant
and probable cause requirements in the particular context."''
8
These competing Fourth Amendment objectives-protection of individual
liberty and enforcement of public safety-arise in the school setting. Before
the Court further alters the balance of Fourth Amendment interests so as to
promote school safety, it should thoroughly consider all of the consequences
that new methods of policing will have on liberty and privacy interests. Any
rebalancing will permanently alter Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which
would affect adults as well as children well into the future.
IV. REDUCING SCHOOL VIOLENCE WITHOUT DEMONSTRATING
DISRESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: FIVE POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS
The community may have the means available to reduce school violence
without demonstrating disrespect for individual dignity. The purposes of the
proposals that follow range from immediate prevention, to deterring others
after violence has already occurred, to long-term prevention.
One possibility proposes designing school buildings to deter students from
committing violent acts.' 19 By using architectural design to prevent acts of
violence from occurring in the first instance, the need for post-incident
searches and investigation is reduced. To facilitate deterrence, schools could
be designed with more open spaces, fewer dark corners, wider hallways, and
fewer dead-end corridors. Areas where violence tends to occur, such as
locker rooms, bathrooms, and parking lots, would receive additional atten-
tion. "' Coaches' offices could be placed in locker rooms, and only low-ris-
ing lockers would be used. This would provide full visual control.
Bathrooms could be built with baffled entrances, rather than doors, similar
to those used in airports. This would offer students privacy while putting
them on notice that school officials could enter without the warning sound of
an opening door. Finally, the principal's office could be located in an area
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (permitting warrant-
less and suspicionless employee drug-testing); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (hold-
ing that employers may conduct warrantless searches of employees' desks and offices where
search is reaonsable at inception and in scope).
117. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
118. Id. at 619.
119. Interview with John F. Sinnett, architect at Smith-Sinnett Architects, P.A., Raleigh,
N.C. (Aug. 10, 1992).
120. See, e.g., Stern v. New Haven Community Sch., 529 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(permitting visual surveillance of students through two-way restroom mirrors on grounds that
students have reduced expectations of privacy at school).
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that provides full visual control of the parking lots or other problem areas.
Such design solutions would provide an immediate form of prevention:
while the proposal is not aimed at making long-term, far-reaching changes in
the violent conduct of students, its goal is to prevent violent acts immedi-
ately before they occur. If a violent act does not occur, the need for searches
lessens, and thus Fourth Amendment principles are not implicated.
A second proposal involves the use of architectural design to make Fourth
Amendment searches less obtrusive. As previously noted, the use of devices
such as magnetometers is most likely permissible under current Fourth
Amendment reasoning,121 and provides immediate prevention. While this
may be a legitimate means of eliminating weapons from schools, the use of
the least expensive, most obvious, metal detector might give a prison-like
appearance to schools. In contrast, a detector could be concealed by build-
ing it into all school entrances. Thus, school boards should consider
whether obtrusive, court-approved searches can be implemented in a less
intrusive manner by taking advantage of newer methods of architectural de-
sign. While a less intrusive method may be more expensive, it would mini-
mize the severity of the clash with Fourth Amendment privacy principles.
A third proposal involves deterring students from engaging in future vio-
lent conduct after violent acts have already been committed. In theory,
other students would be deterred122 from future violence by learning that
those responsible for violent acts have been punished. 123 Because such pun-
ishment does not involve searches or seizures, it has the potential to reduce
121. See supra part II.B.2.
122. For a discussion of the prospect of deterrence, see HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39-44 (1968); Deuteronomy 19:20; Johannes Andenaes, The
General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 951-54 (1966) (discussing
impact of punishment on deterring crime).
123. Such punishment could include time-out, detention, and exclusion from extracurricu-
lar activities. In addition, the school board may wish to evaluate the merits of imposing rea-
sonable corporal punishment. The Supreme Court has held that reasonable disciplinary
corporal punishment administered by school officials does not offend Eighth Amendment prin-
ciples proscribing cruel and unusual punishment, and is thus a permissible means of maintain-
ing student discipline and order. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). As Justice Powell
reasoned:
The concept that reasonable corporal punishment in school is justifiable continues to
be recognized in the laws of most States.... It represents "the balance struck by this
country," between the child's interest in personal security and the traditional view
that some limited corporal punishment may be necessary in the course of a child's
education.
Id. at 676 (citations omitted); see Gaspersohn v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 330 S.E.2d 489
(N.C. App. 1985) (upholding state statute that permits school officials to "use reasonable force
in the exercise of lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils and maintain order"). But cf
Alan Reitman, Corporal Punishment in Schools-The Ultimate Violence, 9 CHILDREN'S
LEGAL RTS. J. 6 (1988) (suggesting that physical punishment should not be imposed upon
children in the school setting).
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school violence without demonstrating disrespect for Fourth Amendment
privacy and liberty interests. In addition to punishing the student who has
committed the violence, civil 124 or criminal' 2 5 liability could be imposed
upon the offending student's parents. While a civil remedy would serve to
compensate the individual victim for injuries suffered, the criminal law
would be used to protect the collective welfare of the community. Civil lia-
bility would be imposed when an injured student pursued a successful tort
action against the offending student and that student's parents. In accord
with this civil remedy, a court could order that damages be paid to the vic-
tim by the parents of children who perpetrate violence on their fellow stu-
dents. 126 In addition, some communities are experimenting with legislation
that imposes criminal liability upon the parents of children who injure fellow
students with weapons. 127 Theoretically, a parent convicted under the crim-
inal law could be incarcerated as well as fined. 128 Arguably, students would
be further deterred from engaging in violent conduct by learning that par-
ents, as well as their children, can be held both civilly and criminally liable
for violent acts committed by their children.
A fourth possibility involves designating alternative schools for disruptive
children. Some public school districts are currently experimenting with this
rather new and somewhat controversial alternative.' 29 Unlike ordinary
schools, which serve all children, the mission of alternative schools is to
serve only the most disruptive students. While the specific nature of pro-
124. At common law the general rule was that parents were not liable for the torts of their
minor children solely on the basis of the parent-child relationship. This rule has been sup-
planted in most jurisdictions by statutes that impose liability on the parent, and these statutes
have been upheld as a constitutional exercise of the states' police power. See Vanthournout v.
Burge, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343-44 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (upholding constitutionality of Parental
Responsiblity Act); First Bank Southeast v. Bentkowski, 405 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (imposing liability on parents for minor children's acts which meet the statutoly ele-
ments); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316, 703 (1986); Wade R. Habeeb,
Annotation, Parents' Liability for Injury or Damage Intentionally Inflicted by Minor Child, 54
A.L.R.3D 974 (1991) (examining laws that address parental liability for children's crimes);
B.C. Ricketts, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Making Parents Liable for
Torts Committed by Their Minor Children, 8 A.L.R.3D 612 (1966).
125. See generally Craig E. Pinkus, Note, Criminal Liability of Parents for Failure to Con-
trol Their Children, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 332 (1972) (declaring it "unlawful for the parent or any
minor to fail to exercise reasonable parental control" if the minor commits criminal acts result-
ing from that failure) (citing MADISON HEIGHTS, MICH., CODE § 8-221 (1970)).
126. See Habeeb, supra note 124.
127. See, e.g., Shelia M. Poole, The South in Brief, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 18, 1992,
at A3 (discussing North Carolina proposal to impose liability on parents whose children bring
weapons to school).
128. This Article will not address the prerequisites necessary for criminal liability.
129. See generally NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFETY CENTER, ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS FOR
DISRU'TIVE YOUTH (1989) (providing detailed information and a useful bibliography regard-
ing specific alternative education programs being operated by various states.)
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grams varies, students prone to violence are generally referred to separate,
resource-intense, public schools within the school district. At their best,
such schools include a strong counseling component, have better teacher-
student ratios, and establish firmer parameters and consequences on student
behavior. Whether such schools succeed at reducing violence and provide
students with a foundation for success, or merely serve as a dumping ground
for violence-prone students has yet to be demonstrated. Unfortunately, if
alternative schools become nothing more than holding tanks, even greater
damage is likely to be inflicted upon liberty and privacy values.
The final possibility addresses the need to curtail violent conduct by stu-
dents on a long-term, far-reaching basis. While officials must intervene in
schools to reduce the presence of weapons, violence, and disruptive behavior,
such intervention only addresses symptoms. Preventative efforts must also
address, at an early stage, the source of the motivation to bring weapons into
schools in the first place. Such prevention cannot wait until weapon-related
violence occurs at the elementary or secondary school level; preventative ef-
forts must be undertaken as early in a student's learning process as possible.
For nearly a decade, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice has at-
tempted to formulate long-term solutions to escalating levels of school vio-
lence. 130 Various experts, with differing perspectives on education, have
testified before the Subcommittee. The opinions offered by these profession-
als include the following recommendations: (1) schools must place higher
expectations and demands, including upgraded graduation requirements and
increased homework requirements, on students;' (2) efforts must be under-
taken at the earliest grade level to diagnose and remedy student behavioral
problems;' 3 2 (3) students should be encouraged to demonstrate good citizen-
ship through supervised participation in community improvement projects
and school beautification programs; 133 (4) a systemwide code of discipline,
including "cooling-off" rooms, in-school suspension, and special counseling,
must be developed and implemented so that fair and consistent standards
and penalties are applied throughout the district;134 (5) students must be
exposed to law-related education and provided an opportunity to operate
student courts in order to teach respect for legal principles and the rule of
law. 13
130. Crime and Violence in the Schools: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1984).
131. Id. at 136-37 (statement of Constance Clayton).
132. Id. at 137-38.
133. Id. at 137.
134. Id. at 117 (statement of Peter F. Flynn).
135. Id. at 21, 137 (statements of Albert Shaker & Constance Clayton).
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Clearly, these five options are not exhaustive. Furthermore, each sugges-
tion requires more thorough evaluation before being implemented. Rather
than attempt to be exhaustive or engage in an encyclopedic review, this Arti-
cle simply suggests that there do exist methods to reduce school violence
which minimize damage to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Legislatures
and school boards must thoroughly consider all plausible solutions which
have the potential to reduce school violence while teaching and demonstrat-
ing respect for personal privacy and individual liberty.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court must be vigilant in regulating the interplay between the proce-
dures implemented by school boards to achieve safer schools and the effect
these measures have on the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
School children are increasingly inflicting weapon-related violence upon
other students at an alarming and escalating rate. While this school violence
is just one symptom of the deterioration in family, community, and individ-
ual values, society must meet its obligation to better protect children while in
school. The Fourth Amendment, as currently interpreted, permits the use of
various procedures to improve school safety. Yet, the increased level of liti-
gation over this complex issue suggests that teachers, administrators, and
school boards are challenging established parameters with novel safety meas-
ures of questionable constitutionality.
When school officials engage in enforcement measures that fall outside the
boundaries permitted by the Fourth Amendment, and thus subject students
to unconstitutional searches, students may be entitled to compensatory
damages, injunctive relief, or punitive damages. Furthermore, when school
officials knowingly violate the Fourth Amendment, they tarnish the commu-
nity's integrity.
Actions taken by school officials to improve school safety teach students
about the community's attitude toward personal liberty and individual pri-
vacy. As noted by Justice Brennan, "[s]chools cannot expect their students
to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities them-
selves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional
freedoms."' 36 The approaches that future court justices, who are today's
school children, will take in interpreting and modifying the Fourth Amend-
ment are shaped by the lessons taught to those children today.
Two conflicting objectives are at the core of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. On the one hand, individual privacy and liberty interests must be
136. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority should have granted certiorari and reversed the lower court decision that held
that warrantless "dragnet" police dog searches do not contravene the Fourth Amendment).
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respected; on the other hand, the government must enforce measures that
promote public safety. In the school setting, the goal of enforcing public
safety has dominated. Indeed, in the Court's zeal to protect school children,
it has already reduced the threshold requirements necessary to justify a
school search. Consequently, the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amend-
ment as providing greater protection of privacy rights to adults than to chil-
dren while in school.
Additional harm to established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may re-
sult from the Court's disregard for the. doctrine of stare decisis. The Court is
likely to approve enforcement procedures that are inconsistent with estab-
lished Fourth Amendment doctrine, partly because such methods protect
children, and partly because such procedures vent political pressure to en-
hance school safety. The harm from such decisions will vary depending on
the nature of the Court's opinions. If the Court renders a series of result-
oriented holdings which articulate inconsistent reasoning, then lower courts,
legislatures, school boards, administrators, and teachers will be left to re-
solve novel situations without proper guidance. The Court may also choose
to expressly overrule established precedent and alter the balance between the
contending Fourth Amendment interests. By this course, the Court might
profoundly tilt the balance toward safety and enforcement and away from
personal liberty and individual privacy.
Before discarding Fourth Amendment precedent and tradition, it is essen-
tial to thoroughly consider solutions that have the potential to reduce school
violence without jeopardizing individual privacy and liberty interests. Such
possible solutions include changing school designs, emphasizing deterrence,
and creating alternative schools. In addition, school officials must launch
long-term, far-reaching preventative efforts that address students' underlying
motivations to bring weapons into school and commit violent acts. Most
likely, a workable solution will combine several approaches. However, it is
critical that the community determine whether it has the means available to
reduce school violence without jeopardizing personal privacy and individual
liberty. The community must resolve this inquiry before reacting to escalat-
ing anxiety regarding school violence, and before pursuing enforcement
measures which have little regard for the effect on individual privacy and
liberty interests.
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